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Searching for Deliberative Democracy 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Approaching the turn of the 21st century, many scholars and media experts 
anticipated that the advent of the Internet could provide a powerful and profound 
source of democratization; facilitating not only instantaneous and costless information 
dissemination but also uniquely enabling a two-way ‘many-to-many’ pathway of 
political communication.1 Two decades on and notwithstanding this utopian vision, 
democracy, once again, appears caught in a state of crisis. With populism on the rise 
and political disengagement reaching record levels2, questions regarding the tangents 
that connect democracy and technology must be critically reengaged. Working in this 
vain, this thesis sets out to test the relation between search engine technologies and the 
deliberative model of democracy. Looking specifically at the ideals of equality, 
autonomy and public justification, we ask whether the algorithms underwriting search 
engines invite or inhibit the realization of democratic deliberation.  
 
Keywords: Autonomy, Equality, Choice Architecture, Search Engine Algorithms, 
Deliberative Democracy, Public Justification and the Public Sphere.  
 
 
Hidden beneath the veneer of carefully polished and pleasant to use consumer 
interfaces exists an entire world of which most people are entirely unaware. It is a 
world of numbers, codes and equations; a world of commands, controls and 
configurations. It is a world of algorithms, which, though often obscured, nevertheless 
operates with profound effect. Indeed and despite taking-on a myriad of forms and 
disguises, a technologically attuned lens reveals that algorithms are present and at 
play throughout a vast estate of both human activity and agency. However hidden and 
perhaps hard to comprehend, algorithms subtly yet surely shape not only the range of 
what is possible, but also and more crucially, the range of possibilities we encounter. 																																																								
1 Margetts 2013; Schwartz 1999; Dahlgren 2005  
2 Flinders 2015	
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Though this claim might sound somewhat outlandish, we need not look far to see the 
effects of algorithms at work in the real world. From facilitating online shopping and 
showing me exactly the type of merchandise I like, to optimizing air-traffic control 
and ensuring that I arrive at my holiday destination as cheaply and comfortably as 
possible, algorithms are everywhere. Extending beyond apparel and leisure and 
slipping into the most intimate of human affairs, algorithms even aid us in the search 
for love by calculating compatibility scores and proposing potential marital partners. 
Evidently then, as consumers of goods, of leisure and of love, algorithms have 
revolutionized the way in which we live. It is almost as if mathematicians have 
become magicians, arithmetically catering to our every need.    
 
Admitting the profound effects algorithms have had on individuals as consumers, the 
question begs what effects algorithms might be having on individuals as citizens? 
Indeed and despite seemingly distinct, these are essentially two sides of the same 
coin; the key difference being that while under the gestalt of the former we consume 
products to satisfy our preferences, when under the gestalt of the latter we consume 
information to guide our political will formation. Hence, we might plausibly speculate 
that in a sense similar to how the algorithms underwriting Tinder and Skyscanner 
furnish our desire for leisure and love, the algorithms underwriting search engines 
satisfy our thirst for political information and, as architects of our information 
indexation infrastructure, influence the process of political will formation. Interesting 
in this regard is that despite being widely studied by economists, marketers and 
behavioural psychologists3, philosophers have up until recently remained rather 
reluctant of admitting claims about the relationship between technology and 
democracy. This initial hesitation moreover does not seem entirely unwarranted 
insofar that having barely come to grips with a concept as expansive as democracy, 
explaining its relation to an even more multifaceted phenomenon like technology 
appears a daunting task.  
 
Accordingly, this paper adopts a notably narrow analytic approach and purposefully 
limits its scope to but one conception of democracy, and, a single tangent of 
technology; looking specifically at search engine algorithms and the effects thereof 																																																								
3 Chebat, J. & Marie-Odile, R., 2016 
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upon the realization of democratic deliberation. To focus this analysis further still, our 
enquiry is constrained to the consideration of just three deliberative ideals, namely: 
autonomy, equality, and the process of public justification. At the same time and 
toward the same end, the range of algorithms brought into frame throughout this 
analysis is equally limited: focusing exclusively on the random-surfer-model and the 
bias-surfer-model. Clarifying both of these at a later stage, what is important for the 
reader to note here is that this investigation is interested in uncovering how these two 
algorithms effect the autonomy, equality and public justifications of citizens, and, 
whether these technologies, by consequence, can be said to invite or inhibit the 
realization of democratic deliberation.  
 
Admitting that answering this question requires a comprehensive understanding of 
both the ideals in question and the algorithms at play, Chapter I will be devoted to 
considering each of these components more carefully. Chapter II in turn brings both 
elements together; analysing the effects these algorithms inhibit and invite with regard 
to the realization of autonomy and equality as well as the process of public 
justification. Working stepwise toward our overarching claim and tying together its 
three constituent parts, Chapter III concludes that search engines endanger rather than 
engender the realization of democratic deliberation. Chapter III will additionally 
suggest avenues for further research, anticipate various possible refutations and 
outline some of the limitations that constrain this investigation. With regard to this 
last point, I here take a brief moment to pre-emptively alleviate some of the concerns 
and objections the reader might raise against the approach and arguments I here 
intend to adopt and present respectively.  
 
First then, it should be stressed that the arguments advanced here pertain exclusively 
to the public sphere. Accordingly, our level of analysis avoids a discussion of 
deliberative democracy along any of its institutional dimensions and focuses solely on 
the formation of political will within informal discursive spaces. Conceding that the 
notion of the public sphere remains highly contested, we here embrace a rather broad 
understanding of what constitutes the public domain and set to work with Dahlgren’s 
definition which characterizes the public sphere as “a constellation of communicative 
spaces in society that permit the circulation of information, ideas and debates for the 
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formation of political will”.4 Following this definition, the public sphere can be 
conceptualized as consisting of all informal, physical, and virtual spaces where 
political issues are discussed and political opinions formed.  
 
Immediately worthy of note in this regard is that even though both Habermas and 
Rawls assert that deliberation only need take place at the institutional level 5 , 
according to this author, deliberation is paramount also within the public sphere itself. 
This position is supported by Cohen6, as well Gutmann and Thompson, who argue 
that, “If moral arguments are essential to justify both the foundations and the results 
of democracy, then why should they not also be essential within the on-going process 
of democracy?”7 Indeed and to the contrary, “It is more likely that neglecting the 
possibility of moral argument in any part will only multiply this imperfection in the 
whole”. 8 In turn prompting Benhabib to assert that, “A public sphere of deliberation 
about matters of mutual concern is essential to the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions”.9 
 
Second, it should be noted that despite the effects and actions the two aforementioned 
algorithms invite and inhibit with regard to the realization of the three deliberative 
ideals in question, this paper does not endorse a strictly deterministic understanding of 
the relationship between technology and democracy. Nor do we, to the contrary, side 
exclusively with proponents of the constructivist school. Rather and as somewhat of a 
hybrid combining these two modes of thinking, we here adopt a Latourian 
understanding. According to whom, society and technology should not be viewed as 
separate entities but rather as a single network that consists of both human ‘actors’ 
and non-human, that is technological, ‘actants’.  Following this approach, “Action is 
simply not a property of human actors alone, but of an association with actants”10 so 
that the outcomes produced are determined neither by actors nor actants in isolation, 
but rather and only through the networked interaction between them.  																																																								
4 Dahlgren 2006, p.148 
5 Habermas 1984, Rawls 1997 
6 Cohen 1997 
7 Gutmann & Thompson, p.41 
8 Gutmann & Thompson, p.41 
9 Benhabib, p.69  
10 Latour 1999, p. 182 
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Important to note here moreover is that this distinction between actors and actants, 
according to Latour, helps us avoid a fallacious and fictitious dichotomy contained 
within the classical subject-object model.11 This insofar that unlike traditional modes 
of analysis, which tend to frame the interaction between two entities as consisting of 
an active subject asserting its will on some passive object, understanding the 
interaction that characterizes the relationship between technology and society 
demands that we attribute an active role to both of these components. To illustrate this 
with an example, Latour considers the typical claims presented by both pro and anti 
gun control advocates. While the former tend to assert that “guns kill people”, the 
latter contest this by arguing that “people kill people”. According to Latour however, 
both groups of advocates are mistaken; for without a person to shoot it, a gun is just a 
gun, and equally so, without a gun to shoot, a person is just a person. Thus the fact of 
a gun being fired and a person being killed only becomes a possibility, and indeed a 
reality, upon the interaction of these two; that is this human actor and technological 
actant.  
 
Adding further nuance to this interaction, Latour points out that the gun not only  
“enables… but also instructs and directs”. 12  Indeed and thinking in terms of 
‘programs of action’, Latour goes on to suggest that “Each artefact has its script, its 
potential to take hold of passersby and force them to play a part in its story”.13 In this 
sense, the gun, or any other technology for that matter, cannot be conceptualized as a 
completely neutral carrier of human will, but must rather be understood as containing 
within it, that is in virtue of its very design, some set of instructions, or rather and 
articulated more mildly, certain features that invite certain courses of action. 
Nevertheless and despite these features as well as the directives contained therein, the 
actant does not in any strict sense determine the action taken by the actor. To the 
contrary and much more subtly, the technology only extends an invitation, which, to 
manifest into reality, must be accepted by the wielder of that technology. Hence we 
here leave behind the rather dated and simplistic juxtaposition between technological 
determinism14 and social constructivism15 and view the effects of technology on 																																																								
11 Latour 1999 
12 Latour 1999, p.176 
13 Latour 1999, p.178	
14 Smith, M. & Marx, L. 1994 
15 Winner 1993 
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society and society on technology as bi-directional. Though thereby leaving behind “a 
stable point of origin for causation”16, this uniquely interactive interpretation is both 
desirable and appropriate because it allows for a more fluid and accurate analysis of 
the relationship between technology and democracy.  
 
Subsequently, the claim advanced here that these algorithms inhibit rather than invite 
democratic deliberation does not amount to claiming that these technologies are 
determinant of the demise of democracy. Rather, it is a call to attention that given the 
current configuration, that is, the way in which human actors and search engine 
actants presently interact, threatens the realization of our democratic dream. 
Imperative to understanding the nuances that characterize this configuration is that we 
acknowledge the effects of choice architecture. Borrowed from behavioural 
economics, this term is used to describe the idea that people “do not make choices in a 
vacuum. They make them in an environment where many features, both noticed and 
unnoticed, can influence their decisions”. 17  As such, the natural, social, and 
technological settings within which choices are presented can be understood to 
provide both incentives and disincentives for making certain decisions.  That is, for 
doing or refraining from doing certain things.  
 
Considered in the context of this enquiry, I emphasize that the ways in which search 
engine algorithms index, present, prioritize, and frame results in response to user 
queries effects the ways in which users respond to those results; inviting and 
inhibiting them from engaging with certain sources as well as directing them toward 
particular types of content. Indeed then, the ways in which these algorithms retrieve 
and represent information imposes a design upon that information so that the choices 
made by the user follow not only nor entirely from the users will, but are in part 
guided by the will of the algorithm. Hence again, it is neither the actor nor the actant 
alone that determines the outcome, but rather the interaction between them that gives 
rise to one reality over another. 
 
Important to note here in turn is that the idea of choice architecture contains within it 
two further, fruitful distinctions. First and thinking in terms of intentionality, the 																																																								
16 Rieder 2005, p.29	17	Thaler , Sunstein and Balz 2014, p.1 	
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design of choice environments can contain both intentional and non-intentional sets of 
instructions. Indeed and despite often being created in such a way as to align the users 
choices with the ambitions of the designer, these systems are so complex that the 
effects thereof frequently go far beyond both the intention and imagination of the 
original architects. Second and speaking in terms of structures, the design of choice 
environments can be both imposed from the top-down or manifest more organically 
from the bottom-up.18 While top-down technological design entails that all users 
encounter the same frames containing the same sets of choices, bottom-up design 
implies that the frames and choices the users encounter are the organic product of 
their own preferences. This insofar that the frames and choices presented to a user 
vary as function of the input, that is the data, that the user has provided through his 
previous interactions with the choice platform. As such, choice environments that 
feature bottom-up technological design create personalized frames of choices that 
cater specifically to the preferences expressed by individual users. In this regard, and 
important for understanding the here ensuing analysis is that the choice environments 
created by search engine algorithms are both intentional and organic, so that the 
results a user encounters follow not only from the instructions of the algorithm, but 
also from data pertaining to the users previous interactions with the choice platform.  
 
Returning to the implications of this distinction at a later stage, for now, I conclude by 
highlighting that given the immense number of junctures at which technology and 
democracy intersect, the claims put forth here should not be misconstrued as holding 
true across all tangents that interweave these two phenomena. Indeed, it could very 
well be that despite the potentially negative effects of search engine algorithms 
discussed here, there remain a great many other technologies that promise to expedite 
rather than curtail the emancipation of our democratic and deliberative enterprise. In 
light of these countless possibilities and entanglements moreover, I reiterate once 
more that this thesis purposefully adopts a particularly narrow analytic lens: focusing 
exclusively on the ideals of equality, autonomy and public justification within the 
public sphere, we ask how the two aforementioned algorithms effect these ideals and 
whether search engine technologies invite or inhibit the realization of democratic 
deliberation consequently? 																																																								18	Alfano and Cheong 2018	
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Chapter I 
 
 
Section I. Ideal Conditions for the Realization of Democratic Deliberation  
 
Admitting the vast body of work already advanced in support of the deliberative 
model, the following chapter avoids any normative evaluation of this democratic 
archetype. Rather, we here assume, a priori, that deliberation is indeed the ideal 
method and justification through which democracy, both as a procedure and a 
substantive conception of the good, is to be realized.19 Adopting this attitude as our 
point of departure, our focus turns exclusively to considering those conditions that are 
requisite for the realization of authentic deliberation. What is more and in light of the 
wide range of conditions that constitute an ideal deliberative environment, the account 
given here is by no means exhaustive. Much to the contrary and for reasons outlined 
earlier, we have here chosen to adopt a particularly narrow analytic lens and 
purposefully limit our investigation to the consideration of just three constitutive 
conditions, namely: equality, autonomy and the ideal of public justification.  
 
Though each of these values can and will be considered separately on a theoretical 
plane, they are, in practice, inextricably intertwined. So much so, that as soon as one 
of them is forsaken, the remaining two are automatically vacant, and, the notion of 
deliberation consequently no longer serves as a justification for the democratic 
governance of a nation. Taken together then, autonomy, equality and the process of 
public justification are considered to be constituent of the deliberative model insofar 
that if not constructed upon these three pillars, the entire enterprise collapses. Hence, 
our overarching claim that search engine technologies inhibit rather than invite the 
realization of democratic deliberation, can be confirmed by demonstrating that these 
technologies inhibit rather than invite the realization of equality, autonomy and public 
justification. This insofar that if equality, autonomy and the process of public 
justification are not respected, democratic deliberation cannot be realised, or, at least, 
not realised in any democratically sustainable sense.  
																																																								
19 Gutmann and Thompson 1997; Fishkin 1991; Cohen 1997 
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Admitting then that the most fundamental condition and ultimate ambition of any 
democratic undertaking is to ensure and enable the peaceful and prosperous 
coexistence of free and equal individuals, the question begs how, under conditions of 
social pluralism, each individual can exercise this freedom in a manner compatible 
with the equal freedom of others? Indeed, since democracy is supposed to be an 
exercise of self-governance in which all are equally free to pursue their own destiny, 
one of the most complex problems this system must solve is how to justify the 
exercise of collective authority without illegitimately infringing on individual 
autonomy.  
 
In this respect and according to various authors, the only way to remain self-
governing under such conditions, that is, conditions of moral equality and social 
plurality, is to engage in a process of providing reasons that other, autonomous 
agents, are able to accept.20 Indeed, the only legitimate way in which the autonomy of 
an individual can be safeguarded against the authority of the collective is if this 
authority is grounded in a process that is acceptable to the autonomous agent, that is, a 
process of public justification. Alternatively, the exercise of authority requires the 
imposition of coercion, which, ipso facto, violates the equality and autonomy of the 
individual and therein forfeits any claim to institutional legitimacy. Hence, the 
process of public justification provides a unique path toward preserving individual 
autonomy and democratic legitimacy in a society characterized by political 
disagreement amongst people of equal moral worth.21  
 
The obvious question left begging by this synopsis, is what exactly this process of 
public justification might entail? In this regard, a review of the literature reveals a 
number of important components. Though an in depth analysis of each escapes the 
scope of this paper, I will here nevertheless attempt to bring into frame three of the 
most pivotal parts. First then, the reader should note that underlying the process of 
public justification is the principle of reciprocity. Indeed, the principle of reciprocity 
is the core constitutive and regulative ideal that enables the process of public 
justification22. As such, the notion of public justification it is not so much concerned 																																																								
20 Habermas 1984; Rawls 1997; Mokrosinska 2018 
21 Elster 1998; Behabib 1996; Walzer 1983	
22 Gutmann and Thompson 1997; Behabib 1996 
	 13	
with the content of any particular disagreement but focuses rather on prescribing the 
rules that regulate how disagreements should be dealt with. Understood accordingly, 
“The principle proposes a basis on which those who morally disagree can 
cooperate”23 and “can provide standards for regulating the process by which they 
(moral disagreements) may be resolved, and for sustaining practices of 
accommodation when they cannot be resolved”.24 
 
The importance of this regulative function becomes particularly pronounced in 
pluralistic societies where different people hold different moral convictions. Couched 
in this context, the principle of public justification neither strives for nor demands 
political consensus. To the contrary, it provides a way of “agreeing to disagree”25 and 
aims solely at governing the deliberation in such a way that the outcomes produced 
thereby are acceptable to all, even if the resulting policy ostensibly favours one 
conception of the good over another. Important to note in this regard is that the only 
way in which an outcome, whatever its particular content, is acceptable to all, is if the 
procedure that produces that outcome ensures and awards equal moral and political 
weight to all citizens. Deliberation thus, as regulated by the process of public 
justification, demands that citizens consider each other as equals, giving equal 
consideration and respect to the arguments formulated by their political opponents.   
 
This recognition of moral equality in turn is commonly expressed through the idea of 
mutual respect. Though similar to the canonically democratic ideal of toleration, 
“mutual respect demands more than toleration. It requires a favourable attitude toward 
and constructive interaction with, the person with whom one disagrees”. 26 
Consequently, the possibility of finding public justifications acceptable to all under 
conditions of pluralism requisites that citizens show mutual respect for one another, as 
moral equals, when attempting to resolve political disagreements. To this end, the 
principle of reciprocity, in its most minimal sense, moreover stipulates that reasons 
presented in the public sphere should be logically consistent and follow only from 
relatively reliable methods of enquiry.27  This is important for fruitful deliberation 																																																								
23 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p.67 
24 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p.67 
25 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p.67 
26 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p.78	
27 Gaus 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1997 
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insofar that it avoids an appeal to the occult and thus constrains political discourse to 
terms of rationality that are accessible and acceptable to all. Probing slightly further 
still, mutual respect, following lines of rational argumentation, thus demands, or, in 
the very least implies, that citizens should be “open to the possibility of changing their 
minds or modifying their positions at some time in the future if they confront 
unanswerable objections to their present point of view”.28 This proposition in turn 
incorporates a number of interesting elements that are frequently portrayed as 
imperative for the process of public justification and the realization of successful 
deliberation consequently.  
 
Moving along ascending levels of abstraction, the point that citizens should keep open 
the possibility of modifying their position can be conceptualized as a practice, an 
attitude and a principle. As a practice, this idea relates to the ‘give-and-take’29 of 
argument, which stipulates that in order for deliberations to be productive, citizens 
must both ‘give’ arguments for their own position as well as ‘take’ arguments from 
the opposition. As an attitude, this translates to the notion of ‘mutual respect’30 so that 
citizens must be willing to actively and constructively engage this practice of ‘give-
and-take’ with an outlook that awards equal moral weight to all political opponents. 
Finally and as principle, keeping open the possibility of modifying ones position is 
most concisely captured by the standard of ‘provisionality’31, which, as a safeguard 
against the finality of any democratic decision as well as the imperfectability of 
human cognition, holds that in a democracy all decisions are only ever temporarily 
binding and will always remain open to objection at hand of newly discovered 
evidence. Indeed and in the words of Michael Walzer “In democratic politics, all 
destinations are temporary. No citizen can ever claim to have convinced his fellows 
once and for all”.32 
 
To briefly summarize, the ideal of public justification should thus be understood as a 
process that regulates the interactions between free and equal individuals so that the 
outcomes achieved are acceptable to all. Admitting moreover that in pluralist societies 																																																								
28 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p.78 
29 Gutmann and Thompson 1997 
30 Behabib 1996	
31 Gutmann and Thompson 1997	 
32 Walzer 1983 p. 32 
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“comprehensive moral conceptions neither can nor should win the assent of all 
citizens”33, the perspective of public justification “does not require consensus… at its 
centre instead stands an appreciation of principles that set the conditions of political 
discussion”.34  Indeed and “recognizing that politics cannot be purged of moral 
conflict, it seeks a common view on how citizens should publicly deliberate when 
they fundamentally disagree” 35 so that, “it can help citizens resolve moral conflict 
with fairness, and, when they cannot resolve it, enables them to work together in a 
mode of mutual respect”. 36 
 
What is more and as asserted above, the discharge of public justification thus 
requisites the realization of at least three things. First and as a practice, people must 
engage in the ‘give-and-take’ of rational arguments that they believe to be at least 
potentially acceptable to all. Second and as an attitude, people must participate in this 
‘give-and-take’ of argument with an outlook of ‘mutual respect’ that awards equal 
moral weight to all citizens, taking seriously and respecting the points of view 
presented thereby. Finally and as principle, people must endorse the standard of 
‘provisionality’ and concede that any democratically authoritative decision is only 
temporarily binding insofar that new information brought to light at some future 
moment may provide a more agreeable solution.  
 
Moving on to the ideal of equality and briefly engaging its formal dimension; equality 
is often presented as a necessary condition for the legitimacy of government because 
only under conditions of equality can the fairness of the procedure be ensured. 37 This 
argument in turn, is grounded in the belief that all human beings are of equal moral 
worth, and hence, that the only justification for the exercise of authority is that each 
person has an equal stake in that authority.38 Indeed, and if this is not the case, the 
exercise of authority through coercive impositions of power is not only morally 
unjust, but politically unjustifiable. Accepting these assertions a priori, more 
interesting and important for our present discussion is in how far this notion of formal 
																																																								
33 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 91 
34 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 92 
35 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 93 
36 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 93	
37 Cohen 1989; Freeman 2002 
38 Marmor 2007; Goodin and Pettit 2006 
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equality is supported by the substantive conditions that characterize the contemporary 
public sphere. In this regard and to quote at length,  
 
“Political Equality is, for Deliberative Democracy, a complex 
conception, consisting of both procedural and substantive 
requirements…For deliberative democracy, political equality entails a 
guarantee of effective participation and thus a concern with the capacity 
of individual participants to engage in the process of mutual persuasion. 
Therefore, equality of capacity becomes a central feature of the 
requirements of political equality”.39 
 
Commenting further on these substantive capacities, Christiano argues that “An 
egalitarian process of deliberation… ensures equality of opportunity to contribute to 
the formation of the agenda for collective decision making and equality in the 
cognitive conditions for citizen decision making”.40 Considering both these claims 
more carefully, ‘equality of opportunity’ here pertains to the idea that for equality to 
obtain, the public sphere must be shaped in such a way that all citizens have an equal 
voice in the deliberative process, that is to say, that all citizens enjoy equal 
communicative opportunity. ‘Equality in cognitive conditions’ and ‘equality of 
capacity’ furthermore imply that all citizens should be equally well equipped, in terms 
of their cognitive capabilities, to engage rationally and critically with on-going 
discussions in the public sphere.  
 
Novel in this regard and particular to the context of this enquiry, is that the notion of 
cognitive capacities is here understood as extending onto the idea of computer 
literacy. This insofar that, beyond being rational and critical thinkers capable of 
performing public speech-acts, the ability to engage with online discussions depends 
decisively on knowing how to navigate online environments. Indeed, expressing ones 
political opinions online requires much more than the mere ability to voice an 
argument verbally, rather, it requisites that citizens become competent users of 
communication technologies. Hence, equality of cognitive capacities, understood 
																																																								
39 Knight and Johnson 1997, p. 281	
40 Christiano 2008, p. 190 
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accordingly, encompasses also equality in computer literacy, a position that will be 
considered more carefully in Chapter II, section I.  
 
Returning to Christiano for now, he further argues that these opportunities and 
capacities should not be “undermined by a skewed distribution of power and 
wealth”.41 As such, the substantive conditions for realizing equality in the public 
sphere requisite an egalitarian distribution of those cognitive capacities and 
communicative resources necessary for voicing ones arguments. More concretely, and 
admitting that inequalities in wealth and power are perhaps hard to avoid, for the 
demands of equality to be satisfied, particular groups that possess greater 
communicative resources and cognitive capacities than others should nevertheless not 
be permitted to dominate discourse in the public sphere. Rather, the public sphere 
should reflect and represent equally the interests of all its members. Hence the 
exercise of hegemony of one group over another through the unequal distribution of 
either, or both, cognitive and communicative resources is in all instances incompatible 
with the ideal of equality.  
 
Though much remains to be said about the requisite conditions for the realization of 
substantive political equality in the public sphere, we reserve this discussion for later. 
Presently, we proceed to the notion of autonomy, considering both its formal and 
substantive dimensions. Formally then, for individual autonomy to be respected 
within a system of collective authority, Rousseau, amongst others, suggests that all 
those that are subject to a law must at the same time be co-authors of that law.42 
Accepting this line of reasoning a priori and considering it in the context of 
democratic deliberation, one important substantive implication is that co-authorship 
requisites the capacity of citizens for critical reasoning. This insofar that since the 
outcomes of the process are generated through the give-and-take of critical 
argumentation, in order for citizens to be co-authors of the outcome, that is the law, 
they must be capable of participating in the process, that is this give-and-take of 
critical argument. Hence, autonomy through co-authorship, in the context of 
democratic deliberation, provisions the capacity for critical thought.  
																																																								
41 Christiano 2008, p. 191	
42 Scott 2012 
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Another intimately related aspect of autonomy is that citizens, as critical thinkers, are 
free to form their own political opinions. Indeed and seen specifically in the context 
of the public sphere, to be autonomous is to be able to freely form and articulate ones 
beliefs, so long as these beliefs respect the principles that regulate the process of 
public justification e.g. the principles of reciprocity, mutual respect and 
provisionality. 43  Substantively speaking then, the freedom to form ones own beliefs 
necessarily entails that citizens have access to a wide range of information as to guide 
their political will formation. What is more, this access to information should be 
granted in an entirely unadulterated and unfettered fashion. This insofar that if certain 
groups control the available sources of information, then this control ipso facto 
interferes with the autonomy of other citizens to critically and freely form their own 
beliefs. Hence, the hegemonic control of information or external imposition of 
structures on its dissemination is here seen as standing directly at odds with the 
attainment of autonomy and the possibility of authentic deliberation in the public 
sphere consequently.  
  
Tying together these two components, we can identify an interesting, mutually 
dependent and reinforcing relationship between the capacity to think critically and the 
facility to freely access information. This insofar, that the very virtue of critical 
thinking can only be cultivated in an environment that permits citizens to freely and 
carefully consider competing informational claims. Hence, in order for citizens to 
become critical thinkers that are not only capable of forming their own beliefs, but, 
moreover, free to do so, they must be able to access information freely and critically 
at their own accord.  
 
To conclude this section then, we have here avoided any normative evaluation of the 
deliberative model and instead assumed, a priori, that this method indeed offers the 
most suitable approach for the realization and justification of our democratic 
enterprise. What is more, we have here restricted our analysis to just three specific 
conditions that are critical for creating an authentic deliberative environment. In this 
regard, the reader is reminded that we have purposefully omitted an array of other 
conditions potentially relevant for the realization of authentic deliberation – leaving 																																																								
43 Ritola 2015	
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room for future considerations. In any case, and with reference to the analysis 
conducted thus far, we have only briefly discussed the formal dimensions of these 
three ideals; emphasizing instead the therefore requisite substantive conditions.  
 
Accordingly, we found first that the regulatory process of public justification is itself 
regulated by a number of important principles, namely: the principles of reciprocity, 
mutual respect, and provisionality. These principles, in turn, petition that citizens 
participate in the ‘give-and-take’ of rational arguments, adopt an attitude of ‘mutual 
respect’, and concede that in a democracy, all decisions are only temporarily binding. 
Second, we established that in order for equality to obtain, all citizens in the public 
sphere must enjoy equal communicative opportunity, as well as be equally well 
equipped in terms of the cognitive capacities necessary for formulating and 
articulating their own political opinions.  Note again that, within the context of this 
particular enquiry, these capacities are understood to extend beyond citizen 
competencies in critical reasoning and encompass also the notion of computer 
literacy.  
 
What is more, and as we have found, this capacity for critical reasoning is also a 
requisite condition for the attainment of autonomy. This insofar that since the 
outcomes of the process are generated through the ‘give-and-take’ of critical 
argumentation, in order for citizens to be co-authors of the outcome, they must be 
capable of participating in the process. Hence, autonomy through co-authorship, in 
the context of deliberative democracy, requires the capacity for critical thinking. 
Finally, as both a substantive condition supporting this capacity and an independent 
grounding of autonomy, we identified that citizens need to enjoy unadulterated access 
to a wide range of political information. Not only because this cultivates their 
capacity for critical reasoning, but also because it guarantees that the political 
opinions citizens form are genuinely their own and not the product of external 
regulations on information dissemination, which, as we have argued, stands directly at 
odds with the autonomy of citizens to critically and freely form their own beliefs.  
 
Admitting these conclusions and looking back toward our overarching claim, one task 
still left outstanding prior to arguing that search engine algorithms inhibit rather than 
invite the manifestation of these conditions, is a more careful analysis of these 
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algorithms themselves. Hence, to demonstrate the adverse effects these algorithms 
invite, we must first come to a clearer understanding of how these algorithms, as 
architects of our informational infrastructures and creators of the choice environments 
we encounter, steer users toward certain actions that are contingently more or less 
compatible with the ideals of democratic deliberation outlined here. To this end, the 
next section discusses in detail the structures these algorithms impose upon the 
process of information indexation, dissemination, and prioritization.  
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Section II. Search Engines Explained  
 
As argued at the very outset of this paper, algorithms are everywhere; begging the 
question what they are exactly and how it is they operate? Painting in broad strokes 
first and filling in the details later, algorithms are best understood as scripts of code 
that perform computational functions according to specified sets of instructions.44 As 
such, algorithms are equations that enable us to process complex sets of data and 
information within a field of well-defined parameters. To take a simple example, 
imagine that I, as a user, want to travel to Thailand. Thus, the problem the algorithm 
must solve is how to transport one unit of human cargo from Amsterdam to Bangkok. 
But this is not all, the algorithm also requests that I specify further parameters, or, 
instructions, e.g. I do not want to pay more than 1000 euros and I want to arrive 
before the end of next week. Taking the problem as well as the specified parameters 
into account, the algorithm scans all available information and performs a 
computation that produces a range of possible results, for instance KLM flight 2037 
departing from Schiphol Airport at 09:45 this Wednesday.  
 
Considered in the context of search engine technologies and applied to the acquisition 
of political information, the problem the algorithm must solve is the question asked 
by the citizen user, for instance, how will Brexit effect UK and continental European 
relations? Taking this problem as its starting point, the algorithm assesses all available 
data and produces results according to a specified set of instructions. These 
instructions in turn typically relate to an analysis of keywords and link-structures so 
that the results produced in response to the request prioritize those pages that contain 
the relevant keywords most frequently and are most frequently linked by other pages 
that are themselves frequently linked. Though this might sound somewhat obscure, 
rest assured, a more elaborate explanation will ensue shortly. For now, I direct the 
readers’ attention to some more general remarks.   
 
First then, it should be noted that search engine technologies occupy a particularly 
privileged position on the web. According to recent studies, they are the most “used 
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type of offer in the Internet”45 with Google alone conducting 3.5 billion searches a 
day and attracting an estimated 72% of first order online interactions.46 Described 
variously as gatekeepers47, view-shapers48 and informational indexes49, common to all 
these conceptualizations is that search engines are like windows into web, and alike 
windows “tend to go largely unnoticed because our gaze focuses on what is visible 
through them”.50 Following Marshal McLuhan’s famous credo that ‘the medium is 
the message’51, the aim of this chapter is to make visible the invisible, and focus 
foremost on the frame rather than the landscape it encloses.   
 
Second, the reader should be made aware that an extensive analysis of the exact 
mathematical apparatus that characterize the algorithms underlying search engine 
interfaces escapes the scope of this paper. Note also, that the actual algorithms 
employed by various search engine providers are closely kept and well protected 
secrets. 52  Hence, this paper relies on the understanding of academic computer 
scientists and their approximations of the models that seem most likely to be used by 
commercial search engine sites. Furthermore, and admitting the vast range of 
algorithms currently in use, we will here be considering just two of the most 
prominent versions, namely: the random-surfer-model and the bias-surfer-model, 
commonly known and henceforth referred to as PageRank and Predictive Search, 
respectively. Finally, though our analysis focuses chiefly on Google; as the market 
leader it is safe to assume that alternative providers strive to emulate its methods, and 
hence, the arguments advanced here can be understood as broadly applicable across 
the information indexation industry.  
 
Nevertheless and to nuance this assertion, I alert the reader that there are a number of 
more esoteric search engines, specific to certain academic disciplines, that employ 
altogether alternative algorithms and are as such not the subject of this analysis. 
However, since these engines are used chiefly by topical experts, they are unlikely to 																																																								
45 Neuberger 2005, p.4	
46 Statcounter 2018 
47 Neuberger 2005 
48 Rieder 2005 
49 Blanke 2005 
50 Hinman 2005, p.21 
51 McLuhan 1964 
52 BBC 2016 
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effect the ways in which the wider population goes about acquiring political 
information. Indeed, and admitting that between them, Google, Bing and Yahoo 
account for over of 97% of all online searches53, the arguments advanced here remain 
relevant insofar that they pertain primarily to people of rank and file, not the academic 
or industrial elite.   
 
Accordingly, and speaking in layman’s terms, search engine technologies can be most 
crudely defined as “Computer programs that find information on the Internet by 
looking for words that you have typed into a box on the screen”.54 Probing slightly 
further, and providing a more technical rendition of this rather basic definition, Rieder 
Beinhard characterizes search engines as “A piece of software that creates an index of 
a defined set of data, includes a retrieval technique to access that index and uses a 
specific mode of representation to display the results”.55 Working with this more 
elaborate explanation, the remainder of this chapter focuses on clarifying how search 
engines index, retrieve and represent results at hand of the two aforementioned 
algorithms.  
 
Starting with PageRank as the mainstay and flagship of Google’s success, the 
algorithm underlying this approach to information indexation initiates with the 
premise of a hypothetical user who is arbitrarily located somewhere on the web and 
randomly clicks and follows links from one page to the next without any kind of bias 
or preference. Supporting this premise, Google’s mission statement specifies that, 
“Our search results are generated completely objectively and are independent of the 
beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google”.56 Accordingly and as argued 
by Gupta and Jindal, “the user shows no bias toward any page or link. As such, 
PageRank reflects the probability of a page being visited by such a user under this 
model. The algorithm furthermore assumes that if a page has a link to another page 
then it votes for that page”.57 Resultantly, each link to a page increases the importance 
of that page in a sense similar to the system of academic citation, where a paper that is 
cited frequently by other papers is considered central to the issue at hand.  																																																								
53 Statcounter 2018 
54 Cambridge Dictionary 2018 	
55 Rieder 2005, p.27 
56 Google 2019 
57 Gupta and Jindal 2008, p.1  
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Rather however than relying solely on the number of links to a certain page, A, 
PageRank also attributes greater weight to pages that are frequently linked by other 
pages, B, C D, which are themselves frequently linked. Hence, PageRank employs a 
kind of recursive algorithm “In which the rank of a page depends upon the rank of the 
pages linking to it. Thus, not only the number of links to a page influences its rank but 
also the rank of the pages linking it”.58 Though considerably more detailed and 
complex in practice; this basic mechanism can be captured through the following, 
rather rudimentary equation:  
 !" ! =  !"(!)! +  !"(!)! + !" !!      
 
Where page is A is being linked by pages B, C and D; so that the PageRank of A 
varies as a function of the ranks (B, C, D) and number of links (X, Y, Z) of pages 
linking to it. Again, this equation represents the PageRank mechanism in its most 
basic form and should thus be principally understood as offering a foundational 
expression on which more sophisticated and real-world models may be built. 
Nevertheless, and more important for the arguments to be advanced in the following 
Chapters, this equation reflects the underlying idea that the indexation, representation, 
and prioritization of results displayed in response to a given search query are neutral 
and objective insofar that they are the outcome of a computation which weighs 
importance and relevance solely on the basis of keywords and link-structures, not any 
normative or partial evaluation of the content contained within specific pages.    
 
Parking our discussion of PageRank for now, we proceed to consider the algorithm 
underlying Predictive Search. Immediately worthy of note in this regard, is that while 
PageRank assumes a hypothetical user acting under random conditions, Predictive 
Search assumes that this user has a given set of preferences and acts in a deliberate as 
opposed to random fashion. Accordingly, and under this model, “the user is assumed 
to move towards that page whose content is most similar to the current page that the 
user is on”.59 Consequently, the algorithm produces results not merely through an 
analysis of link-structures, but rather supplements this analysis by evaluating the 																																																								
58 Gupta and Jindal 2008, p.1	
59 Gupta and Jindal 2008, p.5  
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content of an initially engaged page and at hand thereof recommending pages 
containing similar sorts of content.  
 
Though again concealed within the private and proprietary domain of search engine 
providers, various independent studies have established that the algorithms evaluation 
of content similarity follows from by now familiar and predictable methods of 
semantic analysis. Most likely employing the TF-IDF language model, Predictive 
Search detects similarity and ranks relevance accordingly by attaching meta-
descriptions that help contextualize the meaning of the users queries.60 Integral in this 
regard also, is that the power of Predictive Search to produce content-sensitive results 
requisites the creation of personalized user profiles. To this end, search engine 
providers employ a two-pronged approach; storing and analysing data pertaining to 
both past user queries, and, user responses to the results produced by those queries. 
Accordingly, “Profiling enables online interfaces such as Google to tailor both search 
suggestions (using predictive analytics) and answers to search queries (using 
prescriptive analytics) to an individual user”.61 What is more and over repeated 
interactions, the search engine refines its algorithm further and further to prioritize 
precisely those results that it assumes the user is most interested in. 
 
In this sense, the pages and types of content initially engaged by a user instruct the 
Predictive Search algorithm to prioritize similar pages and types of content in 
response to future queries also. Consequently, this algorithm continually contracts and 
narrows the range of results the user encounters to those that match his previously 
indicated preferences; prioritizing particular over comprehensive sources and sets of 
information.62 Considered within the context of choice architecture, this algorithm can 
thus be understood to invite the user to engage certain sources over others insofar that 
the way in which the algorithm prioritizes and presents information, renders it more 
or less likely that the user engages this information. Indeed, if the algorithm has 
determined that the user is interested in a certain type of content, it will prioritize and 
frame similar types of content in such a way that invites the user to engage that 
content. Hence, the choice environment a user encounters follows from both the 																																																								
60 Manning, Raghavan & Schütze 2009  
61 Alfano and Cheong 2018, p.14 
62 Rieder 2005; Hinman 2005; Thaler , Sunstein and Balz 2014	
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instruction of the algorithm, that is, to produce similar content, and the input of the 
user, that is personalized data about what types of content he prefers.  
 
Though we have here forgone an analysis of the precise mathematical formulas that 
capture the Predictive Search algorithm and are requisite for the creation of 
personalized user profiles, important for the reader to take away from this discussion 
is that in juxtaposition to the claimed ‘objectivity’ of PageRank, Predictive Search 
explicitly strives to produce personalized, that is ‘subjective’ results. Indeed, while 
PageRank prioritizes pages purely at hand of an analysis of keywords and link-
structures and thus creates a space of choices that reflects results accordingly; 
Predictive Search prioritizes pages according to a semantic analysis of source and 
content similarly – creating a choice environment that encourages users to engage 
those sources and types of content that are most similar to the sources and types of 
content engaged in the initial query-response interaction.  
 
Having clarified both algorithms accordingly and in anticipation of the arguments to 
be advanced in the following Chapter, let us briefly reflect on the ideas presented thus 
far. Starting with the claim that search engine technologies inhibit rather than invite 
the realization of democratic deliberation, our efforts so far have focused on two 
things. First, and in the previous part, we outlined what exactly the ideals of equality, 
autonomy, and public justification can be understood to entail within the context of 
the public sphere; simultaneously asserting that these three values are constitutive of 
the deliberative model insofar that if they are not respected, deliberation no longer 
serves as a justification for the democratic governance of a nation.  
 
Second, and in this current section, we have presented two approximations of the 
PageRank and Predictive Search algorithm.  Demonstrating that, while the former 
aims to produce objective and normatively neutral results through a purely 
arithmetical analysis of keywords and link-structures, the latter, to the contrary, 
strives to prioritize search results in line with the subjective preferences of individual 
users by taking into account both source and content similarity. Though perhaps still 
somewhat elusive, a curious reader might at this point begin to speculate in what ways 
then these two algorithms effect the manifestation of equality, autonomy and public 
justification within the public sphere.  
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In this regard and for the sake of being forthright, the next Chapter will present three 
arguments, each linking one algorithm to one deliberative ideal and all working 
toward confirming our overarching conclusion. Arranged accordingly, my first 
argument asserts that despite being normatively neutral, the PageRank algorithm is 
not objective with regard to respecting the equality of actors in the public sphere; 
instead giving way to the Matthews effect63 by granting greater communicative power 
to established players while making it more difficult for ordinary citizens to make 
their voices heard. Hence, this first argument links the PageRank algorithm to the 
ideal of equality and asserts that the structures this algorithm imposes upon the 
indexation and prioritization of information inhibits rather than invites impartiality 
within democracies informal discursive spaces.  
 
Second, and with an eye on the process of public justification, I argue that the 
Predictive Search algorithm inhibits rather than invites this ideal insofar that instead 
of stimulating the give-and-take of argument between people of different political 
persuasions and ensuring that political adversaries adopt an attitude of mutual respect, 
Predictive Search pushes citizens toward evermore disparate islands of political 
communication and will formation, therein moreover giving way to the phenomenon 
of political polarization. Indeed, and admitting that this algorithm not only prevents 
users from exposure to alternative political positions but in fact actively reinforces 
their previous predilections by prioritizing results according to source and content 
similarity, leads me to assert that Predictive Search is moreover incompatible with the 
principle of provisionality. Consequently and on all these counts, I conclude that the 
structures this algorithm imposes upon the indexation and prioritization of political 
information are detrimental to the attitudes, practices and principles requisite for the 
process of public justification.   
 
Third, and arguing against another implication of the Predictive Search algorithm, I 
assert that this method of information indexation and prioritization adversely effects 
the exercise of human autonomy. Adopting a particularly thick and substantive 
understanding of this concept, I point toward the stark reality that in prioritizing 
future results according to an analysis of previous searches, Predictive Search 																																																								63	Merton 1968		
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effectively constrains and determines the development and freedom of our future 
selves to a technology that in essence attempts to perpetuate the past. What is more, I 
will also argue that rather than promoting and cultivating critical reasoning through 
granting unadulterated access to a wide range of political information, Predictive 
Search largely bypasses human cognition by structurally constraining the types of 
content users encounter. Hence along this avenue also, I conclude again that search 
engine technologies inhibit rather than invite the requisite conditions for, and 
consequent realization of, democratic deliberation.  
 
Having here rather crudely condensed and abridged all three arguments, the next 
Chapter considers each of these claims more carefully. Pre-empting this, and adding 
nuance to qualify the here ensuing analysis, I remind the reader once more that 
despite these predominantly negative effects, this paper does not endorse a strictly 
deterministic understanding of the relationship between technology and democracy. 
Rather, and as stated at the very outset of this thesis, these effects are the outcome of 
the interaction between human actors and technological actants. They are thus neither 
absolute nor irreversible, but rather invited or inhibited by the current configuration of 
information indexation.  	
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Chapter II 
 
Section I. PageRank & Perpetuating Inequalities  
 
Having in the previous Chapter brought into frame three ideals of democratic 
deliberation as well as two algorithms that structure the indexation and prioritization 
of online information, we are now finally in a position to reengage our overarching 
thesis, that is an enquiry into whether the structures these algorithms impose upon 
information indexation and prioritization invite or inhibit the manifestation of these 
three ideals, and, as such, can be said to endanger or engender the realization of 
democratic deliberation. Working stepwise toward this overarching claim, the reader 
should note two things. First, we are in this present part concerned exclusively with 
the ideal of equality, leaving aside for now any discussion of public justification and 
autonomy. Second and guiding this analysis of equality, we are here solely interested 
in uncovering the effects of the PageRank algorithm, making no mention of Predictive 
Search. Hence, the arguments to be advanced here link the PageRank algorithm to the 
ideal of equality and assert that the structures this algorithm imposes upon the 
indexation and prioritization of information impede rather than respect the realization 
of political equality in the public sphere.  
 
Working in this vain and as argued previously, for political equality in the public 
sphere to obtain, all citizens must enjoy equality of opportunity. What is more and in 
contrast to the institutional level, where equality of opportunity entails that all citizens 
have an equal vote64, within the public sphere this prescript demands that all citizens 
have an equal chance to make their voices heard, that is, an equal chance to 
participate in public and political debate. Hence, the here following analysis sets out 
to assess whether the PageRank algorithm respects this ideal by granting equal 
communicative opportunity to all citizens. Immediately worthy of note in this regard 
is that the realization of communicative equality requisites two things. First, all 
citizens must be equally well endowed in terms of those cognitive capacities 
necessary for being able to engage rationally and critically with on-going discussions 
in the public domain. Second, and supporting these cognitive capacities, all citizens 
must furthermore enjoy equal access to those communicative resources requisite for 
expressing their political opinions in the public sphere.  																																																								
64 Prothro and Grigg 1960 
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Considering both of these components more carefully, equality of cognitive 
capacities, as seen within the context of this enquiry, encompasses also equality in the 
domain of computer literacy. This insofar that, beyond being rational and critical 
thinkers capable of performing public speech-acts, the ability to engage with online 
discussions depends decisively on knowing how to navigate online environments. 
Indeed, and as asserted earlier, expressing ones political opinions online requires 
much more than the mere ability to voice an argument verbally, rather, it requisites 
that citizens become competent users of communication technologies. Hence, equality 
of cognitive capacities, understood accordingly, encompasses also equality in 
computer literacy.  
 
Second, and besides being cognitively capable of forming rational arguments as well 
as knowing how to express these online, for equality of communicative opportunity to 
obtain, citizens must moreover enjoy equal access to those resources necessary for 
communicating their political convictions to a wider online audience. Particularly 
interesting in this regard, and to immediately contrast the promise of new media with 
the draw backs of traditional broadcasting, is that while under the traditional model 
access to these communicative resources was largely reserved for media 
conglomerates, the advent of the Internet was anticipated to extend this access to a 
wider citizenry. Supporting this positive outlook, scholars and media experts at the 
time highlighted two qualities in particular that forebode this promise of enhancing 
communicative equality in the public sphere.  
 
First, they pointed toward the Internets unprecedented ability to facilitate global and 
instantaneous information dissemination at virtually zero cost65, in keeping with the 
deliberative ideal that all citizens should have full and equal access to all relevant 
sources of political information. 66   Second, they emphasized the revolutionarily 
democratic style of communication made possible by the Internet. Indeed and in 
contrast to traditional broadcasting where communication tended to flow unilaterally 
from ‘one-to-many’, the Internet uniquely enabled a two-way ‘many-to-many’ 
pathway of political communication.67 This quality in turn was anticipated to produce 																																																								
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66 Gimmler 2001 
67 Dahlgren 2005	
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desirable effects for the practices of democratic deliberation insofar that it might 
empower and therein help transform passive citizens into active and engaged 
participants.68 
Immediately worthy of note in this regard then is that Habermas, all throughout his 
theory of deliberative democracy, expressed earnest apprehension about the anti-
democratic tendencies of traditional media.69 Pointing precisely toward the passivity 
induced thereby as well as highlighting the hegemonic structure of information 
dissemination that characterized traditional broadcasting. Taking this skepticism as our 
point of departure and contrasting it with the democratic promise of new media, the 
question begs to what extent the Internet has actually helped facilitate the 
manifestation of our democratic ideals? Or, more precisely, and as situated within the 
context of this particular Chapter, to what extent the PageRank algorithm invites or 
inhibits the equality of communicative opportunity enjoyed by citizens in the public 
sphere?  
Important to recall here is that the PageRank algorithm prioritizes query response 
results according to an evaluation of keywords and link-structures so that the results 
produced in response to the users request prioritize those pages that contain the 
keywords most frequently and are most frequently linked by other pages that are 
themselves frequently linked. In this sense, PageRank employs a recursive algorithm 
“In which the rank of a page depends upon the rank of the pages linking to it. Thus, 
not only the number of links to a page influences its rank but also the rank of the pages 
linking it”.70 Consequently, the question to which we must now turn is whether this 
prioritization of pages according to an analysis of link-structures engenders 
communicative equality or not?  
In this regard, for equality of communicative opportunity to obtain in the public 
sphere, all citizens must be equally adept users of communication technologies as well 
as enjoy equal access to those resources that are requisite for creating systems of link-
structures that warrant high page priority. This insofar that it is page priority that 
allocates communicative opportunity, so that, if these cognitive capacities and 
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communicative resources are not equally distributed, these distributive inequalities 
inevitably impose inequalities in communicative opportunity also. Indeed, since 
making ones voice heard in the public domain depends decisively on disposing over 
both the therefore requisite capacities and necessary resources, it follows logically that 
if certain groups possess greater expertise, and at the same time have access to more 
substantial means, then these groups enjoy greater communicative opportunity. Ipso 
facto interfering with the equality of communicative opportunity that is imperative for 
political equality in the public sphere to obtain.  
Probing further and speaking empirically, it should be noted that the requisite facilities 
for creating link-structures that warrant high page priority are, far from equally 
distributed throughout the public sphere, largely reserved for established media 
conglomerates. Indeed and in a sense similar to the structures imposed upon 
information dissemination by traditional broadcasting, PageRank too privileges the 
political positions of those that posses the necessary resources and know-how for 
making their arguments appear in a relevant manner. Supporting this position, I draw 
the readers attention to the phenomenon of ‘search engine optimization’ and the 
consequent fact that media multinationals employ dozens if not hundreds of highly 
trained, highly paid, and highly proficient ‘webmasters’, tasked precisely with 
studying the PageRank algorithm and finding ways of increasing page relevancy 
through creating intricate systems of link-structures that merit greater search priority 
in response to user queries. Indeed, the potential to increase page priority coupled with 
the potential gains to be had from having a highly prioritized page have created 
massive economic incentives and opportunities for those who dispose over the 
necessary resources for employing experts capable of creating such link-structures and 
ensuring high page priority consequently. 71  
To provide some contrast, while very few citizens posses the cognitive capacities 
necessary for creating a web page in the first place, that is, a platform through which 
to express their political opinions online, even fewer citizens have the requisite 
competencies for creating link-structures that would render their pages highly relevant, 
and that are thus required for putting them, that is their pages and the opinions 
contained therein, on par with the priority and consequent communicative opportunity 																																																								
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enjoyed by established actors. What is more, even those citizens that do have this 
know-how, in most cases do not dispose over sufficient financial resources to compete 
with the teams of webmasters employed by media multinationals. Hence, and as 
supported by a wealth of literature, PageRank reinforces rather than reshapes the 
communicative power structures that made Habermas sceptical of traditional media 
insofar that it awards greater priority, and therein grants greater communicative 
opportunity, to the pages of established actors. In this respect: 
“Multiple studies on various political and scientific issues have come 
to the same conclusion, namely that public debate in the Internet, as 
long as it is organized by search engines, advantages established 
actors, while making it more difficult for smaller actors and their 
arguments to appear in a relevant manner”.72 
Accordingly, I argue that Predictive Search potentially exacerbates the Matthews 
effect by providing a medium through which initial inequalities in wealth and power 
become a self-perpetuating vessel for increasing these inequalities further still.73 
Granting ever greater communicative opportunity and political influence consequently 
to those that dispose over the therefore necessary resources, while pushing to the 
periphery further and further those that are already politically underrepresented. 
Supporting this synopsis, Lessig has argued that, “Market logic serves to constrain the 
extent and forms of representation for civic purposes in ways quite familiar from the 
mass media, diminishing its potential as a properly civic communicative space”.74 
Patekis furthermore asserts that from the standpoint of structures, the political 
economy of search engines “suggests that its development is quickly veering toward 
the intensified commercialization that characterizes the traditional media model”.75 In 
turn prompting Sparks to conclude that “These media professionals effectively ration 
public discourse in our societies” so that “The room for genuinely public access is 
very small indeed”.76 
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To test these claims, I invite the reader to enter any politically orientated question into 
the Google search engine, for instance, why did the EU reject Theresa May’s Brexit 
deal? Upon conducting this, or any similar kind of search, what the reader will find is 
that the vast majority of results ranked on the first few pages link exclusively to 
websites of established media conglomerates, usually including the BBC, the 
Guardian, and the New York Times to mention just a few. Important to note at this 
juncture moreover, is that despite prioritizing these pages, the PageRank algorithm 
does not, in any strict sense, determine which one of these pages the user eventually 
engages. Indeed and to the contrary, the user retains the liberty to skip past the most 
prioritized pages and instead follow links to more colloquial and critical as opposed to 
corporate sites.  
However, and notwithstanding this room for individual agency, the way in which the 
PageRank algorithm prioritizes pages contains a ‘program of action’77 that both invites 
and inhibits users to engage certain sources over others. Thinking again along 
Latourian lines, and arguing in terms of choice architecture, everything about 
PageRank, from how it indexes and retrieves information to how it represents that 
information, invites users to select responses that link to pages of established actors 
while inhibiting them from engaging pages created by ordinary citizens. Indeed, and to 
use the appropriate jargon, the interaction between the technological actant and human 
actor that characterizes the way in which we retrieve information online renders it 
exponentially more likely that we engage those pages that have been awarded the 
greatest priority by the algorithms analysis.  
To flesh this out further, Mark Alfano argues that:  
“When the inevitability of choice architecture is paired with collateral 
information about human choice behaviour (including systematic 
cognitive biases), decision-makers will, even when free to make their 
own choices, nonetheless be steered toward particular choices in a way 
that reflects the manner in which the initial space of choices is 
presented”.78   
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Commenting further on these cognitive biases, much work has recently been done, and 
a wealth of evidence collected, to suggest that when selecting and processing online 
information, human cognition falls victim to what has been termed the WYSIATI79 
mind-set. As an acronym for ‘What You See Is All There Is’, this term is used to 
describe a prevalent cognitive condition where consumers of online information 
generally, and, users of search engines specifically, mistakenly presume that the first 
frame presented to them is in fact the only frame there is.  Accordingly, we can 
contingently assert that the way in which the PageRank algorithm prioritizes, presents, 
and frames query responses stimulates a cognitive bias in users that invites them to 
engage only those sources contained in the first frame, that is, precisely those pages 
which the PageRank algorithm has deemed most relevant according to its analysis of 
link-structures. Which, furthermore, and as we have already argued, privileges the 
political positions of established actors insofar that it is only these actors that dispose 
over the necessary resources and know-how required for creating link-structures that 
render their pages highly relevant and prioritized.  
To further illustrate the effects of this cognitive bias with a fitting parable; imagine an 
individual walking into a library and at a glance observing the entire collection of 
books on offer. Indeed then, what he sees, is all there is. Hence, when making a 
decision as to which book to borrow, he basis that decision on an accurate and 
complete understanding of what sources are available to him. Now however, imagine 
this same individual entering a query into Google and Google responding by providing 
a frame of prioritized pages, what he sees, that is this frame, is no longer all there is. 
Much to the contrary, this first frame presented to him captures but the tip of an 
iceberg of information that is hidden on subsequent pages. Nevertheless, and precisely 
due to this WYSIATI mind-set, the user is likely to mistakenly and detrimentally 
presume that the first frame is indeed the only frame, in turn rendering him unlikely to 
engage those sources listed on subsequent pages.  
Relating this back to our discussion of equality in the public sphere, I here argue that 
the PageRank algorithm inhibits rather than invites the realization of political equality 
insofar that, the interaction between this technological actant and human actor 
amplifies inequalities in communicative opportunities in such a way that privileges the 																																																								
79 Kahneman 2011	
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political positions of those that possess a greater share of the resources and skills 
necessary for creating link-structures that warrant high page priority. Indeed, and 
admitting again the cognitive biases that characterize how humans interact with online 
information indexation infrastructures, leads me to the conclusion that the way in 
which information is indexed, retrieved, and framed by the PageRank algorithm, that 
is, the way in which this algorithm creates a space of choices, stimulates a bias in users 
that invites them to engage sources of established actors while at the same time 
making it less likely that they encounter more colloquial and critical opinions 
expressed by their fellow citizens.  
To qualify this conclusion, I draw the readers’ attention once again to the fact that 
these effects are not evident in any strictly deterministic sense, but are rather 
concealed within the interaction between choice architecture and human cognition. In 
this respect, and despite the invitations contained within the algorithms choice 
environment, the actualization of these effects remains contingent on the users 
consent. So that, it is neither the algorithm nor the user alone that give rise to these 
inequalities in the public sphere, but rather and only, the networked interaction 
between them that leads to this outcome. Simultaneously highlighting and confirming 
the bi-directional nature of the relationship that characterizes the ways in human actors 
and technological actants interact.  
Reengaging then once more to the democratic promise of new media as anticipated at 
the advent of the Internet, we can conclude that, despite granting all citizens full and 
equal access to all relevant sources of political information, these sources are, in fact, 
not all equally accessible, or, at least, given the interaction between choice architecture 
and the imperfection of human cognition, not all equally likely to be accessed. What is 
more, and despite theoretically empowering a two-way ‘many-to-many’ pathway of 
political communication, the way in which PageRank presents choices to the user 
combined with the cognitive biases to which the user is prone, inhibits rather than 
invites equality of communicative opportunity in the public sphere because it 
privileges the publications and political opinions of those that posses the resources and 
skills necessary for creating complex link-structures that warrant high page priority.  
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Section II. Predictive Search & the Process of Public Justification 
 
Having in the previous part argued that the interaction that takes place between the 
choice environment generated by Google’s PageRank algorithm and certain human 
cognitive dispositions inhibits rather than invites the realization of political equality in 
the public sphere, the here following Chapter employs an essentially similar analytic 
approach. Rather, however, than focus on the relationship between PageRank and the 
ideal of equality, we now envisage the effects of Predictive Search on the ideal of 
public justification. Hence, the arguments to be advanced here assert that the 
Predictive Search algorithm inhibits rather than invites the process of public 
justification, and, as such, endangers rather than engenders the realization of 
democratic deliberation.  
 
To briefly introduce both concepts, I draw the reader’s attention to the analysis 
conducted in Chapter I. Accordingly, the process of public justification should be 
understood as a procedure that regulates the deliberative interactions between free and 
equal individuals so that the outcomes achieved are acceptable to all. Admitting 
moreover that in pluralist societies “comprehensive moral conceptions neither can nor 
should win the assent of all citizens”80, I reiterate that the perspective of public 
justification “does not require consensus… at its centre instead stands an appreciation 
of principles that set the conditions of political discussion”. 81  Indeed, and 
“recognizing that politics cannot be purged of moral conflict, it seeks a common view 
on how citizens should publicly deliberate when they fundamentally disagree”82 so 
that, “it can help citizens resolve moral conflict with fairness, and, when they cannot 
resolve it, enables them to work together”. 83 
 
What is more and as asserted previously, the discharge of public justification thus 
requisites the realization of at least three things. Moving along ascending levels of 
abstraction, first, and as a practice, people must engage in the give-and-take of 
rational arguments that they believe to be at least potentially acceptable to all.84 																																																								
80 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 91 
81 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 92 
82 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 92 
83 Gutmann and Thompson 1997, p. 93	
84 Gutmann and Thompson 1997 
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Second, and as an attitude, people must participate in this give-and-take of argument 
with an outlook of mutual respect that awards equal more weight to all citizens, taking 
seriously and respecting the points of view presented thereby.85 Finally, and as 
principle, people must endorse the standard of provisionality and concede that any 
democratically authoritative decision is only temporarily binding insofar that new 
information brought to light at some future moment may provide a more agreeable 
solution.86 
 
Having already argued for these assertions in Chapter I, we can immediately turn to 
the Predictive Search algorithm itself. To be equally brief then, while PageRank 
assumes a hypothetical user acting under random conditions, Predictive Search 
assumes that this user has a given set of preferences and acts in a deliberate as 
opposed to random fashion. Consequently, the algorithm aims at producing results in 
response to present queries that match the sources and types of content initially 
engaged by the user. What is more and over repeated interactions, the search engine 
refines its algorithm further and further to prioritize precisely those results that it 
assumes the user is most interested in.  
 
Hence, the pages and types of content initially engaged by a user instruct the 
Predictive Search algorithm to prioritize similar pages and types of content in 
response to future queries. In this sense, the Predictive Search algorithm continually 
contracts and narrows the range of results the user encounters to those that match his 
previous predilections87; prioritizing particular over comprehensive sources and sets 
of information and therein creating a choice environment that reflects a rather narrow 
cross-section of political ideas and thus constrains the choices presented to the user to 
a partial representation of all available information. Hence, and to refine this analysis 
slightly further still, the question to which we must here turn is whether this 
prioritization of pages in response to present queries at hand of an analysis of 
previously indicated preferences inhibits or invites citizens to firstly, engage in the 
give-and-take of argument, secondly, do so with an attitude of mutual respect and 
ultimately, endorse the principle of provisionality?   																																																								
85 Benhabib 1996 
86 Gutmann and Thompson 1997 
87 Rieder 2005; Hinman 2005; Thaler , Sunstein and Balz 2014	
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Though eager to answer these questions, I initiate this part of our enquiry with a brief 
but relevant segue. Speaking in terms of ‘echo chambers’88, Sunstein suggests that 
this technological function of filtering the future content one encounters through an 
evaluation of previously expressed preferences gives way to the phenomenon of 
political polarization. This insofar that, since each person is only confronted with 
those types of sources and content that they personally enjoy and endorse, the 
common ground on which we all stand together, as a political community, is rapidly 
eroding. Indeed, and in contrast to traditional media, which acted as ‘general-interest 
intermediaries’89 – imparting similar sources and sets of information on all individuals 
– online information dissemination infrastructures cater specific and personalized 
types of content to each citizen. Thereby reducing the shared oxygen of political 
debate in the public sphere, and pushing people toward polarized and isolated islands 
of political deliberation and will formation.90  
 
Though this link remains relatively unexplored in the literature, intuitively this point 
is interesting for our discussion here insofar that polarization is, in a certain sense, the 
antithesis of public justification. Indeed, and despite permitting, even praising 
heterogeneity within the public sphere, the process of public justification nevertheless 
requisites some sort of common ground, that is, a shared discursive space, physical or 
virtual, in which citizens of opposing political persuasions come together to 
deliberate. Using a simple yet compelling example, Sunstein contrasts the virtual 
infrastructure of the web with the physical infrastructure of traditional towns and 
argues that, while within the domain of the latter political adversaries cannot help but 
encounter and thus engage in debate within one another; when crawling across the 
web, it is precisely due to the power of algorithms alike Predictive Search that people 
of alternative political persuasions need not only never encounter one another, but are, 
in fact, and more stringently, structurally steered away from any such confrontation.   
 
Hence, while public justification hinges decisively on the rational, respectful, and 
collective deliberation of people that endorse alternative political persuasions, the 
phenomenon of polarization, to the contrary, marks a situation in which people of 																																																								
88 Sunstein 2017	
89 Sunstein 2017 
90 Sunstein 2017; Galston 2002 
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opposing views are driven to such extremes that they are no longer willing, or able, to 
engage in precisely such a process of deliberation. Indeed, though the ideal of public 
justification permits plurality, it nevertheless does “strive for justifiable compromise 
and convergence as much as possible”.91 Political polarization, to the contrary, leads 
to ever-greater divergence and thus endangers the possibility of a productive political 
dialogue. Confounded further by the structures of information dissemination 
technologies, the here following arguments can consequently be understood to 
simultaneously show that whatever informational infrastructure invites polarization, at 
the same time, inhibits public justification, and, as such, stands at odds with the 
realization of democratic deliberation.  
 
Commenting first then on the give-and-take of argument, I argue that rather than 
inviting political adversaries to engage in a rational and critical process of 
deliberation, Predictive Search algorithmically avoids any such style of argumentation 
by structurally steering citizens toward interactions with only those citizens that 
already share in the same political convictions. This insofar that, since the algorithm 
prioritizes pages in response to present queries according to an analysis of previously 
indicated preferences, only those people that have indicated similar sets of 
preferences will encounter similarly prioritized frames of pages. Indeed, it is only 
because the user has expressed a preference for a certain type of content, that that 
content is awarded greater priority, so that, only users that have expressed similar 
preferences are likely to encounter similar content.  
 
Accordingly, and since only people of the same political persuasion encounter the 
same pages, these pages become a meeting place and breeding ground for the 
proliferation of one-sided political opinions, where citizens with the same convictions 
exchange and reinforce rather than challenge each other’s ideas. In this sense, and to 
warrant its name then, these virtual discursive spaces are rightly called ‘echo 
chambers’ because the opinions expressed there are, rather than subjected to critical 
and rational scrutiny, only echoed and enlarged by thousands if not millions of like-
minded voices.92 More troubling still in this regard, is that while the give-and-take of 
argument between political adversaries is praised by proponents of public justification 																																																								
91	Thompson and Gutmann 2004, p.54 	
92 Sunstein 2011; Sunstein 2017 
	 41	
for its power to weed out inaccurate and irrational claims93, recent studies have shown 
that echo chambers “lead the group to converge on falsehood rather than truth, and 
individuals errors, instead of being corrected, can be amplified”.94  
 
Hence, what we witness here is not so much a give-and-take process of 
argumentation, as a give-and-give style of deliberation, in which the claims presented 
by people of a particular political persuasion are never challenged but only confirmed. 
Thereby not only inhibiting the empirical practice of public justification, but also 
inviting political polarization. Supporting this conclusion, Galston points out that, “If 
the Internet facilitates an impressive communicative heterogeneity, the negative side 
of this development is of course fragmentation, with public spheres veering toward 
disparate islands of political communication”.95  
 
Having thus demonstrated that Predictive Search inhibits rather than invites the give-
and-take of argument between political adversaries in the public sphere, we now turn 
to assess whether this algorithm similarly inhibits rather than invites the attitude that 
ideally regulates this interaction, that is, the attitude of mutual respect. Immediately 
worthy of note in this regard is that besides in the first place being presented as 
necessary precondition for regulating the deliberative interactions between people of 
alternative political persuasion96, this attitude of mutual respect, according to Gutmann 
and Thompson, simultaneously and subsequently results from these very interactions. 
Indeed, and in their own words, the “purpose of deliberation is to promote mutually 
respectful processes of decision-making. Deliberation cannot make incompatible 
values compatible, but it can help participants recognize the moral merit in their 
opponents claims when those claims have merit”.97 
Hence, deliberation, as made manifest and practiced through of the give-and-take of 
argument, both prerequisites and reproduces this attitude of mutual respect. 
Accordingly, and despite the well-established empirical limits of behaviourism that 
make it difficult to discern, let alone claim with certainty, whether a person, in the 
privacy of their own mind, adopts this attitude or not, the fact that Predictive Search 																																																								
93 Lamore 2003 
94 Solomon 2005, p.28 
95 Galston 2002, p.41 
96 Lamore 2003	
97 Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p.11 
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inhibits rather than invites interactions between people of alternative political 
persuasions goes a long way toward warranting the claim that this algorithm similarly 
inhibits rather than invites the attitude that regulates these interactions. This insofar 
that, besides being a precondition for these interactions, the attitude of mutual respect 
is also a product of these interactions, so that, the less these interactions occur, the less 
likely it is that people retain this outlook of respect. Indeed, it is precisely and only 
through the give-and-take of argument, that citizens come to cultivate this attitude. 
Hence, the fact that Predictive Search inhibits the give-and-take of argument, warrants 
the suggestion that this algorithm also inhibits the realization of mutual respect 
between political adversaries in the public sphere.  
Lending further support to this conclusion, I draw the readers attention to Benhabib’s 
claim that despite permitting a “plurality of modes of associations”98, crucial for 
retaining productive relationships amongst political adversaries is that “these multiple 
forms of associations and organizations”99 nevertheless converge in the public sphere 
through “interlocking and overlapping networks”.100 Important to note here then, and 
as argued previously, is that rather than connecting polarized political nodes, the 
structures Predictive Search imposes upon information dissemination inhibit any such 
interlock insofar that they structurally steer citizens toward isolated and disparate 
informational islands. Hence, the very fact that there is no such interlock, ipso facto, 
inhibits the extent to which the attitude of mutual respect may be realized.  
Moving on then to the principle of provisionality, and immediately recognizing that 
this standard is desirable within the domain of democratic deliberation insofar that it 
safeguards against the finality of decisions based on imperfect and incomplete human 
understanding101; Gutmann and Thompson assert that “deliberative democrats care as 
much about what happens after a decision is made as what happens before”.102 Indeed, 
and admitting again that the aim of this democratic archetype is to find the most 
agreeable solution through the rational deliberation of relevant and reliable 
information, the principle of provisionality promotes this end by keeping on the 
possibility of finding a more agreeable solution at hand of newly discovered evidence. 																																																								
98 Benhabib 1996, p.73 
99 Benhabib 1996, p.73 
100 Benhabib 1996, p.73 
101 Thompson and Gutmann 2004; Benhabib 1996; Lamore 2003 
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Accordingly, the principle of provisionality demands of citizens that they keep open 
the possibility of changing their minds, and that, rather than conclude on any issue 
with certainty, they continue searching for more satisfactory solutions to on-going 
political disagreements. Hence, the last question this present section aims to address is 
whether the Predictive Search algorithm invites or inhibits the likelihood that people 
remain open-minded and willing to change their political convictions upon 
encountering new evidence? Worryingly, there is a wealth of material to suggest that 
beyond the natural cognitive inclination humans have to retain rather than reform their 
beliefs, this disposition is amplified manifold by the ways in which the Predictive 
Search algorithm indexes, retrieves, and represents information, that is to say, the way 
which the algorithm designs the choice environment the user encounters.  
Starting then with this natural cognitive inclination, Ritola presents an assortment of 
results from various psychological studies which show that, when selecting and 
processing new information “the human agent underuses the normatively appropriate 
reasoning strategies and overuses more primitive intuitive strategies”.103 Clinically 
described as the phenomenon of ‘belief perseverance’, Ritola goes on to identify three 
ways in which people tend to stray from the prescripts of rationality. First then, once a 
subject has formed a theory, exposure to new evidence about that theory, regardless of 
whether it supports or opposes that theory, will reinforce belief in the original theory. 
Second, when a belief is formed on the basis of evidence, subsequent evidence is 
likely to be disregarded. And third, once a theory is formed, even if all the evidence on 
which it is based is discredited, the subject’s belief in the correctness of the initial 
theory is likely to endure. Consequently, and to characterize this cognitive disposition 
rather crudely, Ritola asserts that “Whatever gets in first, regardless of how it got 
there, will stay there, and become entrenched, come what may”.104    
Though these findings are in and of themselves problematic for the principle of 
provisionality, more problematic still, and relevant for this particular enquiry, is that 
this reluctance to reform our beliefs is further reinforced by the structures Predictive 
Search imposes upon the indexation, dissemination, and prioritization of political 
information. Indeed, and directly contrary to Haidt’s observation that correcting these 
errors in human reasoning depends crucially on creating a surrounding that promotes 																																																								
103 Ritola 2015, p.36	
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critical reflection105, Predictive Search, as we have argued, leads citizens to avoid any 
such reflection and rather reinforces their past predilections by arithmetically 
prioritizing future search results at hand of an analysis of previously indicated 
preferences.  
To flesh this out further, Alfano has argued that:  
“Once an individual’s concepts and thinking have been initially furnished, 
shaped, and (through repeated confirmation and reinforcement) ossified 
through interaction with choice architectures… he is liable to become less 
receptive to the very kinds of influences that would otherwise push him 
away from the attractor. To the extent that one’s cognitive and conceptual 
capacity for certain kinds of experiences is already formed through one’s 
interaction history and subsequent cognitive and conceptual alignment 
with the relevant choice architecture, one is vulnerable to capture by the 
attractor. In this sense, one becomes genuinely stuck — intellectually rigid 
and immovable through typical discursive and rhetorical mechanisms.” 106  
Understanding the term ‘attractor’ as describing the function by which the algorithm 
becomes a kind of self-perpetuating vessel for the prioritization of partial information, 
Alfano’s argument here confirms our claim that Predictive Search exacerbates the 
human tendency to retain rather than reform our beliefs insofar that, beyond this 
natural reluctance to admit new evidence, this algorithm furthermore structurally steers 
people away from encountering any such evidence. Indeed, the structures this 
algorithm imposes upon information indexation and prioritization invites users to 
engage only those sources that confirm rather than challenge their previously indicated 
preferences, that is, the ideas they already endorse. Worthy of note moreover, is that 
upon every subsequent interaction, the algorithm is reinforced, so that it refines further 
and further the range of results to an ever narrower assortment of pages that fortify the 
citizens initially adopted political position.  
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Probing further still, and beyond thus inhibiting the likelihood that people encounter 
new evidence, Collins et al. suggest that even if, against unfavorable arithmetical odds, 
users do encounter such evidence, there is a distinctive relationship between source 
familiarity and the agents assessment of content reliability that renders the user 
unlikely to accept any contradictory findings.107 To be brief, studies have shown that 
when processing online information, especially under conditions of low-elaboration, 
users display a tendency to assume source familiarity as a heuristic for assessing 
content reliability. What is more, and confounding these effects of familiarity, further 
experiments have established that we are particularly prone to reflexively accept an 
argument from a familiar source as true, if the content contained therein meets our 
expectations.108 Thus, if a familiar source contains content that we have come to 
expect from that source, we have a tendency to accept that content as true without 
much further scrutiny at all. Conversely, if we encounter an unfamiliar source that 
contains content contrary to our expectations, i.e. contrary to our previously held 
beliefs, we are likely to disregard that content as false, equally without much further 
scrutiny.  
Taking these cognitive biases, and acknowledging that Predictive Search familiarizes 
users with specific sources containing certain types of content, it follows that even if 
the user does eventually encounter another source that contains content contradictory 
to his previous predilections, he is likely to disregard both that source and the 
evidence contained therein as unreliable and inaccurate respectively. Hence, the 
Predictive Search algorithm inhibits rather than invites keeping open the possibility of 
changing ones mind insofar that it stimulates a cognitive bias in the user that renders 
him less likely to accept alternative arguments advanced by unfamiliar sources. 
Ultimately inhibiting the realization of the principle of provisionality insofar that 
citizens no longer reflect critically upon new information, but rather discount that 
information on the basis of a cognitive bias which disqualifies unfamiliar sources 
containing evidence that contradicts their previously held beliefs.  
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To briefly summarize these arguments pertaining to the principle of provisionality, I 
have here demonstrated that the natural human cognitive inclination to retain rather 
than reform ones beliefs is amplified by the Predictive Search algorithm in two ways. 
First and foremost, the structures this algorithm imposes upon information indexation 
and prioritization inhibit the likelihood that citizens encounter new, contradictory 
evidence insofar that it invites users to engage only those sources that contain similar 
types of content to their previously indicated preferences, that is again, the ideas they 
already endorse. Second, and even if, against the instruction of the algorithm, the user 
does happen to encounter contradictory evidence, there persists a fallacious 
relationship between source familiarity and the agents assessment of content reliability 
that renders the user likely to disregard the evidence contained therein. 
Commenting conclusively then, and addressing at once all three levels of abstraction 
along which the process of public justification has here been conceptualized, that is, as 
a practice, an attitude, and a principle. I assert that the arguments presented in this 
current section are subject to the same qualification relating to the autonomy of users 
articulated in the previous part. This insofar that, despite indeed inviting users to 
engage pages that echo rather than challenge their previously indicated preferences, 
users nevertheless retain the liberty to skip past the most prioritized frames and therein 
gain access to pages that present alternative and adversarial political positions.  
Again however, and notwithstanding this room for individual agency, the way in 
which the Predictive Search algorithm prioritizes pages, that is, the way in which it 
presents a space of choices to the user, both invites and inhibits users to engage certain 
sources over others. Thinking again along Latourian lines, and arguing in terms of 
choice architecture, everything about Predictive Search, from how it indexes and 
retrieves information to how it represents that information, invites users to select 
responses that link to pages which reinforce rather than challenge their previous 
predilections. Indeed, and to use the appropriate jargon, the interaction between this 
technological actant and human actor that characterizes the way in which we retrieve 
information online renders it exponentially more likely that we engage only those 
pages that have been awarded the greatest priority by the algorithms analysis.   
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This insofar that, and as argued previously, when selecting and processing online 
information, human cognition falls victim to what has been called the WYSIATI109 
mind-set. Accordingly, we can contingently assert that the ways in which the 
Predictive Search algorithm prioritizes, presents, and frames query responses 
stimulates a cognitive bias in the user which invites him to engage only those sources 
contained in the first frame, that is, precisely those pages which the Predictive Search 
algorithm has deemed most relevant according to its analysis of previously indicated 
preferences. Which, furthermore, and as we have already argued, prioritizes responses 
that link to pages that echo rather than challenge the political positions a user already 
endorses.  
Ultimately thus and along all three levels of abstraction, I argue that Predictive Search 
inhibits rather than invites the process of public justification within the public sphere. 
Indeed, and as we have here shown, this algorithm has been linked to the 
manifestation of online echo chambers, where, in stark juxtaposition to the prescripts 
of public justification, the political arguments and opinions expressed by citizens are, 
far from critically challenged, only ever uncritically confirmed. Consequently, and to 
conclude this part, I assert that Predictive Search drives citizens toward evermore 
disparate and isolated islands of political communication, polarizing the public sphere 
and therein posing a severe threat to the requisite practices, attitudes, and principles 
that are supposed to regulate the process of public justification.  
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Section III. Predictive Search & the Autonomy of Citizens  
 
Having thus far demonstrated that PageRank and Predictive Search inhibit rather than 
invite the realization of political equality and public justification respectively, this 
final Chapter sets out to consider the potentially adverse effects this second algorithm 
invites with regard to exercise of human autonomy. Hence the here following 
arguments aim at asserting that the structures imposed upon information indexation 
and prioritization by the Predictive Search algorithm inhibit rather than invite the 
attainment of autonomy within the public sphere. To this end, I begin with a brief 
reiteration of the requisite conditions for the realization of autonomy as understood 
within the domain of deliberative democracy and seen specifically at the level of 
middle-democracy110, that is, the informal discursive spaces in which citizens come 
together to form and articulate their political will.  
 
As argued in Chapter I, for individual autonomy to be respected within a system of 
collective authority, all those that are subject to a law must at the same time be co-
authors of that law.111 What is more, and admitting again that within the domain of 
deliberative democracy the law is the outcome of a process of critical and rational 
deliberation, it follows that in order to be co-authors of the law, citizens must be 
competent critical and rational deliberators. Another intimately related and equally 
important aspect of autonomy is that citizens, as critical thinkers, are free to form 
their own political opinions. Indeed, and as seen specifically in the context of the 
public sphere, to be autonomous is to be able to freely form and articulate ones 
beliefs.112 
 
Substantively speaking then, obtaining the freedom and capacity to critically form 
ones own beliefs necessarily entails that citizens enjoy access to a wide range of 
information as to guide their will political formation. What is more, this access to 
information should be granted in an entirely unadulterated and unfettered fashion. 
This insofar that, if certain groups control the available sources of information, then 
this control ipso facto interferes with the autonomy of the wider citizenry to critically 																																																								
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and freely form its own opinions. Hence, the hegemonic control of information or 
external imposition of structures on its dissemination is here seen as standing directly 
at odds with the attainment of autonomy and the possibility of authentic deliberation 
in the public sphere consequently. 
 
Chapter I further noted that, there seems to be a mutually dependent and reinforcing 
relationship between the capacity to think critically and the facility to freely access a 
wide range of political information. This insofar that, the very virtue of critical 
thinking can only be cultivated in an environment that permits citizens to freely and 
carefully consider competing informational claims. Hence, in order for citizens to 
become critical thinkers that are not only capable of forming their own beliefs, but 
moreover free to do so, they must be able to access information freely and critically at 
their own accord. Thus, the question to which we must here turn is whether the 
Predictive Search algorithm invites or inhibits both the unadulterated access to a wide 
range of political information, and, the capacity of citizens to critically reflect on this 
information in the process of their political will formation.   
 
Contrasting these conditions for the attainment of autonomy with the by now 
hopefully familiar ways in which Predictive Search indexes and presents political 
information, two implications immediately jump of the page. First is that, far from 
providing unadulterated access to information, Predictive Search externally imposes 
very specific structures on its prioritization. Thus standing directly at odds with the 
prescript of autonomy that citizens should be able to search for information in an 
entirely unfettered fashion. Second, these structures are such that, rather than 
exposing citizens to a wide range of sources and content – containing a broad 
spectrum of political ideas – citizens are, to the contrary, encouraged to engage a very 
narrow and continually contracting bandwidth of political ideas. This insofar that the 
choice architecture generated by this algorithm, that is, the way in which the 
algorithm frames and presents choices to the user, invites users to engage only those 
pages that most closely match their initially indicated preferences.  
 
Worthy of admission at this juncture is the well-grounded objection that any system 
of information indexation and dissemination inevitably imposes some structures upon 
the way in which we retrieve and perceive that information. Indeed, and even dating 
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back to ancients in the library of Alexandria113, men understood that the collection of 
information necessarily entails organization and structuration, for without creating 
some kind of index there is no feasible way in which to wield through the millions 
and billions of bits of information out there. Hence, access is in a certain sense 
impossible without structure, or, at least, rendered meaningless insofar that without 
some kind of index, searching for a source in a library, be it physical or virtual, 
becomes not all to dissimilar from searching for a needle in a haystack.  
 
However, and herein lies the crux of my critique, Predictive Search, unlike traditional 
information indexation systems, is not ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not award 
equal accessibility to all sources.  Much to the contrary, and in conflict with the 
prescripts of autonomy, rather than presenting the user with a wide range of political 
information so that he may critically discern for himself upon which sources to 
construct his political convictions, Predictive Search structurally, continually, and 
lopsidedly contracts the range of ideas that the user is likely to encounter.  
 
Problematized as such, I argue that Predictive Search effectively constrains the 
potential development and freedom of our future selves, as citizens, to a technology 
that in essence attempts to perpetuate the past. Considering this temporal dimension 
of freedom more carefully, I assert that in order for citizens to develop their lives in 
an autonomous manner, they cannot be perpetually steered in a predetermined 
direction as a consequence of their previous predilections. Yet, this is precisely what 
Predictive Search is programmed to do, and precisely why I argue that this algorithm 
inhibits rather than invites the realization of autonomy. Lending further support to this 
claim, a similar idea has recently been ratified within the European Court of Justice. 
Though not specifically pertaining to the effects of Predictive Search, a 2006 ruling 
on ‘The right to be forgotten’ established legal precedent for the idea that a necessary 
condition for the attainment of autonomy is indeed the ability to freely form ones own 
future, independently of online data about ones past partialities.114 
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Moving on then to the second component of autonomy that this discussion aims to 
bring into frame, that is, citizen’s capacity for critical reasoning. Important to recall in 
this regard is that, besides employing prescriptive analytics to tailor responses in line 
with the users previously indicated preferences, Predictive Search simultaneously 
employs predictive analytics: not to suggest responses, but rather to suggest the 
queries themselves. Hence, while prescriptive analytics use data about past query-
response interactions to produce personalized responses to user queries, predictive 
analytics use this same data to anticipate and suggest what the user might want to ask 
in the first place. Thus, not only providing suggested answers, but also suggesting the 
very questions themselves.115    
 
Conceding that this might sound somewhat obscure, I invite the reader to open a 
search tab and type the first three words of any question into the search bar. What the 
reader will find, is that based on these three words, Google suggests a series of 
questions that you may want to ask. Note moreover, that these suggestions are data-
driven, so that, far from being random, are arithmetically and deliberately derived 
from your personal search history, and, accordingly, aim precisely at providing 
suggestions that match your previously indicated preferences, that is, the types of 
questions for which you have previously expressed an interest. 
 
Acknowledging in turn that the activity of critical reasoning is, in its most 
fundamental form, a process of asking and seeking to answer questions, has lead 
Alfano to argue that, “The interaction between predictive and prescriptive analytics 
can largely bypass the individuals contribution to reasoning, supplying both a 
question and its answer”.116 To flesh this out further, while using data to produce 
results that match a user’s previously indicated preferences only determines the range 
of responses a user is likely to encounter, using that data to suggest what questions the 
user wants to ask moreover and more problematically constrains the very nature of the 
user’s curiosity. Hence, beyond merely narrowing the types of content a user 
encounters upon engaging a query, this algorithm effectively and more fundamentally 
limits the types of queries that a user may engage to the queries that he has previously 
sought out.  																																																								
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Besides thereby further confounding the aforementioned constraints on our temporal 
freedom, this function moreover endangers the requisite citizen competency of critical 
reasoning. This insofar that, rather than critically thinking about the questions one 
wants to ask, and, the responses one selects, the algorithm provides both search 
suggestions and answers so that the user need do nothing more than ‘press enter’. 
Hence, this interaction between predictive and prescriptive analytics invites the user 
to avoid any critical thought process and rather follow blindly the suggestions the 
algorithm has ‘thought’ out for him. Leading Alfano to conclude that the “Feedback 
loops between predictive and prescriptive analytics are liable to make the human user 
a largely passive consumer and observer rather than an inquisitive and critical 
questioner”.117  
 
Consequently, and since critical reasoning is a requisite condition for the attainment 
of autonomy, it follows that Predictive Search inhibits the realization of this ideal in 
the public sphere. Inviting citizens, as users of search engines and acquirers of 
political information, to forgo any independent and critical thought process for an 
algorithmic and automated process of question and answer. Hence, Predictive Search, 
along this line of enquiry also, seems to endanger rather than engender the prospects 
of human autonomy. Indeed, the very fact that this algorithm supplies both query 
suggestions and query responses gives rise to the possibility that the political 
convictions citizens form and believe to be their own, are in truth the product of an 
entirely automated process that proceeds independently of any critical and 
autonomous human cognition.  
 
Lending further support to this position, recent studies have shown that content 
engagement on YouTube – a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, Alphabet – is 
particularly prone to succumb to his phenomenon. Indeed, the majority of videos 
users watch on this site are selected completely independently of the user’s 
contribution.118 This insofar that, once the user has selected the first video he wishes 
to view, the technical features of YouTube’s choice environment are such that the 
algorithm can operate autonomously of any actual choices made by the user – 
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mapping out an entire trajectory of related videos that will play, at perpetuity, without 
any appeal to human agency.  
 
Though our analysis has thus far focused foremost on Google, as a fellow subsidiary 
of Alphabet, we can plausibly speculate that the algorithms employed by YouTube 
are not all too dissimilar. Particularly troubling in this regard, is that mp4 is fast 
becoming the preferred format of communication, with ever more people turning to 
video instead of text as their primary source of political information.119 Hence, the 
fact that the problems presented by Predictive Search identified in our analysis of 
Google are even more prevalent within the domain of YouTube, combined with the 
likelihood that YouTube will soon become the worlds leading distributor of political 
information, highlights the urgency and seriousness of this situation.  
 
Finally then, and before concluding this Chapter, one further remark remains to be 
made regarding the qualification presented in the previous two parts. As the reader 
might recall, we qualified our conclusions regarding the realization of equality and the 
process of public justification on the contingency that despite imposing structures on 
information indexation that invite users to engage those sources that inhibit the 
attainment of these two ideals; users of search engines nevertheless retain the 
autonomy to ignore the suggestions and invitations of the algorithm, and instead 
access alternative sources of information that seem more conducive to the realization 
of authentic democratic deliberation.  
 
Hence, as a keen mind might at this stage interject, it seems that one of two things 
must give way. That is, we must either concede that users do indeed retain this 
autonomy, in which case the first two arguments are valid, but the third fails. Or, we 
must admit that these algorithms overpower the autonomy of users, in which case the 
qualification for the first two arguments fails and only the third argument is valid in 
its entirety. However, and rather than getting caught in this juxtaposition, I here 
suggest that the arguments presented in this current section are themselves again 
subject to the autonomy qualification.  This insofar that, despite constraining both the 
temporal freedom and critical capacity of citizens, citizens nevertheless retain the 																																																								
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agency to act in ways contrary to the invitations the choice architectures they 
encounter extend their way. 
 
However, the very fact that the interaction between predictive and prescriptive 
analytics invites users to forgo an independent process of critical reasoning does pose 
a severe threat to this capacity. For indeed, maintaining this critical mindset depends 
decisively on cultivating it at every turn, that is every time that we are confronted 
with the invitations of choice environments. Hence, to qualify the arguments 
presented in this final section in such a way that sustains the qualification presented in 
the previous two parts, I conclude that, despite inhibiting the capacity of critical 
reasoning and therein adversely effecting the autonomy of citizens, citizens can 
nevertheless retain their autonomy through the exercise of critical reasoning, that 
entails an awareness of the choices these technologies present and an active attempt at 
avoiding subjugating our own critical competencies to the allure of the algorithm.  
 
Though this might sound somewhat circular, or like nothing more than a conceptual 
trick conjured up to insulate my thesis from what would be a very relevant objection, 
this is certainly not the case. Much to the contrary, this conclusion fits perfectly 
within the Latourian framework that encompasses this entire enquiry. For what we 
witness here is, once again, not a strictly deterministic relationship between 
technology and society, but rather a bi-directional process in which the resulting 
reality is the outcome of a networked interaction between these two formidable 
forces. Indeed then, the fact that the Predictive Search algorithm inhibits our capacity 
for critical thinking, and thus adversely effects the attainment of autonomy, combined 
with the possibility that cultivating our critical thinking can safeguard against these 
adverse effects, reflects par excellence the notion that this relationship is not at all one 
sided nor in any way deterministic, but rather bi-directional.  
 
Emphasizing again that Latour’s distinction between human actors and technological 
actants is contrived to help us avoid the fallacious and fictitious dichotomy contained 
within the classical subject-object model, neither the human actor nor the 
technological actant here takes on a purely passive role.120 Rather, both of these forces 																																																								
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are actively asserting themselves on and through each other, so that the resulting 
reality is not strictly determined by either one, but indeed and only the outcome of 
their interaction, leaving room for both human agency and technological instruction, 
even if that instruction inhibits this agency. Ultimately thus, and despite at first glance 
appearing to threaten the cogency of my thesis, this final qualification and its 
consequent conclusion stand as a testimony to the validity of the claims articulated 
throughout, capturing rather befittingly the bi-directional nature of the relationship 
that characterizes the interactions between human actors and technological actants.  
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Chapter III  
 
Looking back at the arguments presented throughout this paper, the time has finally 
come to formulate my conclusion. Prior to doing so however, I wish to briefly 
consider a number of limitations that have constrained this investigation. In this 
regard I will identify two technical, two conceptual, and two analytic shortcomings. 
What is more, I will also consider two likely objections the reader might raise and 
respond to each with a preemptive refutation. Last but certainly not least, I will 
conclude this Chapter, and indeed this entire enquiry, by highlighting possible 
avenues for further research and providing a number of recommendations that might 
help insulate our democratic and deliberative enterprise from the potentially adverse 
effects of search engine algorithms articulated throughout this analysis.  
 
Starting then with the first limitation and commenting from a purely technical 
perspective, I remind the reader that the exact equations that underwrite the two 
algorithms brought into frame throughout this analysis remain well kept and closely 
guarded secrets.121 Hence, the arguments advanced here have been based on viable 
approximations of the models that seem most likely to be used by commercial search 
engine sites. Second, and also from a technical viewpoint, access to the exact data 
about the efficacy of these algorithms, that is, how effectively these choice 
environments steer users toward certain types of content, also remains within the 
private domain of search engine providers. Hence, though independent studies have 
shown that these algorithms do invite particular actions, the exact magnitude of these 
effects is as of yet difficult to discern with certainty.  
 
Moving on, I reiterate that we purposefully limited this analysis to the consideration 
of just three ideals and two algorithms. Hence, the conclusions we have drawn here 
should not be extrapolated as holding true across all tangents that connect search 
engines to the exercise of democratic deliberation. What is more, we have here 
forgone an array of equally relevant enquiries relating to the effects of social media 
and big data, both of which play an equally pivotal part in this technological 
reshaping of the requisite conditions for the realization of democratic deliberation.  																																																								
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Finally and analytically, two remarks remain to be made. First, the reader should be 
made aware that the analysis conducted here has considered but one dimension of 
Latour’s work on the relationship between technology and society. Focusing foremost 
on ‘programs of action’122, we have demonstrated that the interaction between human 
actors and technological actants that characterizes the way in which citizens acquire 
political information online invites and inhibits certain political outcomes. What we 
have not done however, is argue that this interaction fundamentally changes the 
nature and meaning of these outcomes. In this regard, and relating to his work on the 
‘boundaries between signs and things’123, further research is warranted to assess 
whether this interaction not only effects these outcomes, traditionally understood, but 
moreover alters the very meaning of these outcomes, that is, changes the very 
vocabulary of notions like equality and autonomy.  
 
Second, and as asserted at the very outset of this thesis, our level of analysis has 
avoided a discussion of democratic deliberation along any of its institutional 
dimensions and instead focused purely on the public sphere. In this regard, and as a 
first objection that my work if likely to encounter, we have failed to demonstrate how 
these effects, apparent within democracies informal discursive spaces, translate to the 
institutional level. The implications of this shortcoming become particularly 
pronounced in light of the well-grounded observation that “There can be all kinds of 
political information and debate in circulation, but there must be structural 
connections – formalized institutional procedures – between these communicative 
spaces and the processes of decision making”.124  
 
Following further in this vain and admitting that rather than being the product of 
direct participation, the laws our democracy produces are the outcome of 
representative deliberation, a critical reader might argue that despite the potentially 
adverse effects search engine algorithms invite within the public sphere, our system 
remains robust against these effects on an institutional level insofar that our appointed 
political representatives do not exist exclusively nor in isolation online, but are rather 
institutionally forced to engage in deliberations with their political opponents. Hence 																																																								
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and in the absence of any structural link between the public sphere and the official 
institutions that constitute our government, we cannot assert that these technological 
effects in any way adversely impose themselves upon the activities of what is 
ultimately the only authoritative, and thus arguably meaningful domain, of democratic 
deliberation.  
 
Against this objection and as common sense suggests, I argue that, if a system is truly 
representative, then it will represent and reproduce on an institutional level the same 
conditions, ideas and attitudes that protrude throughout the public sphere. In this 
sense and despite the mitigating potential of a system of representation, it is 
nevertheless ignorant to believe that the potentially adverse effects these algorithms 
invite in the public sphere will not also echo throughout the galleries of government. 
This insofar that if the requisite conditions for democratic deliberation are not 
respected within the public domain, it becomes exceedingly difficult, even 
impossible, to maintain the democratic legitimacy of our institutional structures. 
Indeed and in the words of Benhabib “A public sphere of deliberation about matters 
of mutual concern is essential to the legitimacy of democratic institutions”.125 
 
Supporting this position and acknowledging once again that equality, autonomy, and 
the process of public justification can be understood as constituent of the ideal of 
deliberation, it follows that if these conditions do not obtain, the notion of deliberation 
no longer serves as a justification for the democratic governance of a nation. Indeed, 
it seems nonsensical, even absurd to suggest that as long as these values are formally 
respected, we need not be concerned with the therefore requisite substantive 
conditions. Much to the contrary and without realizing these substantive conditions, 
these ideals are rendered entirely void of meaning, as would be, by consequence, the 
institutional representation thereof. So that, even in the absence of any clear structural 
link between the public sphere and the formal institutions that constitute our 
government, these institutions cannot not operate independently of the statutes of 
legitimacy that are requisite for the realization of authentic deliberation. This insofar 
that if these requisite conditions are not respected within democracies informal 
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discursive spaces, it is impossible to reproduce and represent them within the official 
structures of a representative system.  
 
Moving on, a second objection the reader might raise is that the effects of these 
technologies, whether apparent within democracies formal or informal spaces, have 
here been overstated. Indeed, there are those who would argue that despite the 
invitations and possibly adverse implications of these algorithms, it remains difficult 
to assert a directly casual, bi-directional relation between these effects and the 
realization of democratic deliberation. In this regard, I concede that the analysis 
conducted here has captured but one dimension of a considerably more complex 
occurrence. Nevertheless, and despite the mediating effects of other social, 
economical, and ideological forces, I maintain that a modern understanding of 
democratic deliberation cannot proceed without some consideration of recent 
technological innovation. Indeed and living in an age where the power of technology 
is fast making science-fiction science-fact, it is imperative that we adjust our analytic 
lens to allow for more forward looking, albeit it less established perspectives, on the 
interactions between technology and democracy.126 
 
Accordingly, I conclude with vigor that the current configuration that characterizes the 
way in which we retrieve political information online contains several challenges for 
the realization of authentic democratic deliberation. Indeed, the interaction that takes 
place between technological actants and human actors in this domain is such that it 
inhibits rather than invites the attainment of autonomy and equality, as well as 
endangers rather than engenders the practices and principles of public justification 
within the public sphere. Supporting this conclusion, we have demonstrated that the 
structures search engine algorithms impose upon the indexation, dissemination, and 
prioritization of political information combined with various human cognitive 
inclinations, renders it so that we must be extremely careful not to give into the 
potentially negative invitations contained within the choice architectures that 
accompany these algorithms.   
As such and to qualify these conclusions a final time, I reiterate that, despite the 
adverse effects these algorithms invite, the arguments advanced here do not amount to 																																																								
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asserting that these technologies are in any strict sense determinant of the demise of 
democracy. Rather, and allowing room for a more flexible and interactive 
interpretation, this analysis should be understood as a call to attention that given the 
current configuration, that is, the way in which search engine algorithms and citizen 
users presently interact, threatens this democratic dream. Acknowledging again then 
the bi-directional nature of the relationship that characterizes the interactions between 
technology and society, I remind the reader that these effects are neither absolute nor 
irreversible, but rather contingent on the ways in which we respond to the choices and 
choice environments we encounter.  
Fittingly thus, I conclude this thesis with three recommendations, each of which 
merits further investigation. First, I believe it to be imperative that citizens become 
more aware of the ways in which the choice environments generated by these 
algorithms invite and inhibit particular actions. Hence, there should be some program 
of education that enhances the capacity of ordinary citizens to critically discern the 
directives contained within the design of these technologies. Second, I urge our 
politicians and lawmakers to create some kind of legal framework that can help 
contain and mitigate the potentially adverse effects these algorithms invite. Insightful 
in this regard are various publications by the International Organization for 
Standardization.127 Though compliance is still voluntary, the benefits of conforming 
to the benchmarks set by this organization provide promising incentives for tech firms 
to adjust their practices accordingly. Nevertheless, and in face of nonconformity, legal 
ratification coupled with appropriate punishment for deviation remains desirable.  
 
Finally, I appeal to the better nature of search engine providers themselves, and ask 
the architects of these technologies to redesign their algorithms in a manner more 
compatible with the demands of democratic deliberation. Though I do not believe, nor 
mean to suggest, that these entities operate with malicious intent, I do stress that they 
are ideally situated to produce positive change. Indeed, the very fact that the way in 
which these algorithms are currently configured inhibits the realization of democratic 
deliberation, illuminates the possibility that changing these configurations can go a 
long way toward reversing the adverse effects thereof. In this regard, PageRank could 
be redesigned to reflect a more representative sample of political sources, not only the 																																																								
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publications of established and entrenched actors. Similarly, the underlying function 
of Predictive Search could be developed further so that rather than presenting citizen 
users with a very narrow and ideologically lopsided assortment of choices; the 
algorithm encourages them to engage a broader and more balanced range of political 
information.  
 
Ultimately, and with promise thus, the very problem identified throughout this 
analysis simultaneously paves the way toward its solution. Indeed, identifying, 
conceptualizing and analyzing the nature of the relationship that characterizes the way 
in which human actors and technological actants interact in the process of acquiring 
political information as bi-directional, puts us in an ideal position to presently and 
actively shape the destiny of our democracy. Hence, I have hereby hoped to inspire an 
awareness of the ways in which the choice environments we encounter through these 
algorithms invite and inhibit certain outcomes, so that, despite the potentially adverse 
effects thereof, there remains room to redirect our current trajectory and redesign 
these technologies in a manner more compatible with the realization of democratic 
deliberation.  
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